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BEYOND SEPARATION AND NEUTRALITY: 
"NON 'MARKET PARTICIPANT" 
AS THE CENTRAL METAPHOR 
OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
JAMES R. BEATTIE, JR.* 
A metaphor has always dominated the Supreme Court's 
religion clause jurisprudence. The metaphor prescribes the proper 
legal and political relationship between religion and government; 
it is a constitutional norm. This article traces the historical 
development of this central metaphor—from separation to 
neutrality—and finds both metaphors lacking in normative 
adequacy. These inadequacies lead to the proposal of a new 
metaphor: government as a "non 'market participant.'" This 
metaphor essentially combines Justice Holmes's "marketplace of 
ideas" with the "market participant" in the Court's Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but with an important twist. The 
normative obligations of the new metaphor prevent government 
from regulating the behavior of citizen competitors in the "religion 
market" (free exercise) and from becoming a competitor or 
engaging in competitor behavior in that market (establishment). 
Both sets of governmental duties are aimed at achieving the single 
goal of maximal religious liberty for citizens. 
INTRODUCTION 
A metaphor has always dominated the Supreme Court's 
religion clause jurisprudence. The Court's use of metaphor does 
not necessarily indicate some deeper failure in constitutional 
interpretation. Rather, it indicates that the meaning of the 
constitutional text and our understanding of the historical setting in 
which it was drafted are radically under-determined.' The text and 
* Associate Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. I want to 
thank Professor Rachel Janutis and Capital University Law School for the 
invitation to present an earlier draft of this paper at the Fall Faculty Lectures 
Series. I also want to thank Mr. Paul Bryson for his excellent research 
assistance. 
The constitutional text reads as follows: "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . 
...";U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
164 
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the drafting history can possibly eliminate a handful of implausible 
interpretations2 but they cannot justify the further selection of one 
central interpretation from among the remaining plausible ones.3  
To make that selection requires a shift in focus from text and 
history to conceptions of constitutional structure and political 
morality.4 This shift in focus is the primary function of the Court's 
chosen metaphor in religion clause jurisprudence. Because the 
constitutional language and the drafting history are capable of 
carrying so many plausible and different, perhaps inconsistent, 
meanings, the Court has availed itself of a central metaphor to 
make sense of it al1.5  
2 For example, Justice Story and Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
"nonpreferentialism"—government can prefer Christian religion over other 
religions as long as it does not prefer any Christian sect over another (Story's 
interpretation) or as long as it prefers religion in general over non-religion 
(Rehnquist's interpretation)—can probably be eliminated as an implausible 
interpretation of the text and drafting history because such language was 
repeatedly rejected by the drafters. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 151 (L. De Pauw ed., 
The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1972) (Senate Journal) (Sep. 3, 1789). For 
Justice Story's interpretation, see 2 JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §1877 594 (The Law Book 
Exchange Ltd. 2005) (1851). For Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpretation, see 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For 
an extended critique of nonpreferentialism, see Douglas Laycock, 
"Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1985/86). 
3 Taking one example, the text and drafting history apparently cannot 
resolve the question of whether free exercise accommodations were required by 
the constitutional text or by the drafters. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The 
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1409 (1990) (arguing for accommodations for free exercise) and Philip 
A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992) (arguing against 
accommodations for free exercise). 
4 Compare Professor Michael Dorf s insight when he writes: 
In addition to constitutional text, history, and structure, 
normative considerations play an important role in fixing 
constitutional meaning. In other words, discussion of the 
question `What does the Constitution mean?' will be informed 
by, and sometimes even collapse into, a discussion of the 
question `What should the Constitution mean?' Thus, when 
asking whether the Constitution protects rights . . . we should 
also ask whether the Constitution ought to protect rights . . .. 
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 1175, 1194-95 (1996) (emphasis added). 
5 Although I do not believe a choice of metaphor or norm in this area of law 
can be avoided, the textualist and the originalist will not be pleased with this 
shift in focus. Of course, the textualist and the originalist face their own unique 
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The Court's chosen metaphor primarily has been employed to 
prescribe (and to proscribe) the proper legal and political 
relationship between religion and government, and has prescribed 
(and proscribed) how lower courts ought to conceive of that 
relationship when applying the law. The chosen metaphor's 
primary function is therefore normative; it constitutes a 
constitutional norm.6 
The use of metaphor in constitutional interpretation is not that 
rare. Much of the Court's free speech doctrine, for example, can be 
understood as drawing on, and as drawing out, the implications of 
the metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas"7 or the competing 
problems. The textualist is committed to let the text "speak for itself." The 
problem with this approach is that words do not come with their unique 
meanings or significance attached; or in the case of the First Amendment, the 
words come with many plausible meanings attached. Professor Philip Bobbitt 
succinctly writes: "Every word in the Constitution is not equally significant, and 
some of its most explicit texts are also its most trivial. More important, in a 
Constitution of limited powers what is not expressed must also be interpreted." 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 38 (1982) (emphasis in original). The 
originalist's approach is committed to a particular historical era's—usually the 
founding era's—interpretation of the Constitutional text. A major difficulty with 
this approach is that while historical research possibly can establish the 
"negative" of a particular textual interpretation, if the founders rejected it, for 
example, it cannot establish conclusively the meaning of the text that they 
adopted. See supra note 2. Again, Professor Bobbitt correctly writes: "[W]hen a 
[constitutional] passage was adopted we are thrown back on the puzzle of 
varying and sometimes incompatible intentions left unexpressed or, in the case 
of trade-offs for votes on other matters, indecisive [] language chosen to satisfy 
objectives other than clarity." BOBBITT, supra, at 13. For an excellent discussion 
of the difficulties associated with originalism—both the difficulties (1) in 
deciphering the historical meaning of constitutional text and Framers' intent, as 
well as (2) in deciding the normative force such meaning, if it can be 
deciphered, should carry today (the "dead hand" problem), see Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 BOSTON U. L. REV. 204 
(1980). I am well aware that there is a new "flavor" of originalism afoot today—
"original meaning (original public meaning) originalism." See, e.g., Randy E. 
Barnett, The Relevance of Framers' Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 
405 (1996). But for the life of me, I do not see how it avoids the difficulties 
associated with the older versions. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 
S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997) (an extended contemporary critique of the new 
version of originalism). 
6 If the reader wishes to substitute the word "norm" for "metaphor" 
throughout, I have no objection. The Court's use of metaphor is primarily 
normative. But the notion of jurisprudence based on metaphor is accurate, I 
believe, in describing how the Court gets embroiled in the "imagery" of the 
norm contained in the metaphor. And besides, as Groucho Marx said, I never 
metaphor I did not like! 
The "marketplace of ideas" is attributed to Justice Holmes, even though he 
never used this exact phrase. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
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metaphor of the "town hall meeting."8 Similarly, the Court's 
jurisprudence explaining the reach of the Commerce Clause 
flowed, for several years, from the metaphor of the "stream of 
commerce."9 In many cases where the meaning of the 
constitutional text and the drafting history are radically under-
determined, the Court has availed itself of the use of metaphor to 
provide a normative focus and guide to applying the law. The 
Court's religion clause jurisprudence is not special in this regard.'°  
The following section briefly traces the historical development 
of this central metaphor—from the metaphor of separation to the 
metaphor of neutrality—and along the way highlights some of the 
more pertinent successes and failures of each proposed metaphor. 
On balance, both metaphors lack in normative adequacy. The 
metaphor of separation is shown to be inadequate because it places 
the protection of free exercise in jeopardy and entails 
discrimination against religion in cases where government aid or 
support is universally available, all the while unnecessarily pitting 
the prescriptions of free exercise and establishment against each 
other. The metaphor of neutrality is shown to be inadequate 
because it proscribes the use of the compelling interest test—
effectively sacrificing the fundamental status of free exercise—and 
does not require non-discrimination against religion in cases of 
universally available government aid, all the while improperly 
embodying a preference for majority religion that is inconsistent 
with our nation's commitment to denominational neutrality. 
Section II then briefly sets forth a proposal for a new central 
metaphor for religion clause jurisprudence—the metaphor of 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But when men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they 
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth 
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."). 
8 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) (the metaphor of the "town hall meeting" prescribes 
potentially greater government regulation of speech because "what is essential is 
not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said"). 
9 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Stafford v. 
Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
I° Perhaps this is as it should be, especially where we are dealing with the 
legal and political treatment of religion. As Professor Harold Bloom writes, 
"Nheology necessarily is a system of metaphors." HAROLD BLOOM, JESUS AND 
YAHWEH: THE NAMES DIVINE 98 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss2/1
[Vol- 2.164 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 168 
government as a "non 'market participant."'" Once the elements 
of the metaphor are explained, this section will develop the 
underlying doctrinal construct that draws on, and draws out, the 
implications of the proposed metaphor. It will then set out some 
preliminary comparisons between the proposed metaphor of non 
"market participant" and the historic metaphors of separation and 
neutrality. 
Finally, section III presents in brief outline how the metaphor 
of non "market participant" applies in Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clause cases. It will also attempt to address the 
more pertinent anticipated criticisms of my proposal. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL METAPHOR: FROM 
SEPARATION TO NEUTRALITY 
A. Separation 
When the Supreme Court reassesses its religion clause 
jurisprudence in earnest,12 it relies upon the central metaphor of 
"separation" or "the wall of separation" between church and state 13 
to focus and prescribe the proper legal and political relationship 
between religion and government. The metaphor of separation 
suggests powerful normative imagery of a "protective" wall 
Depicting government as a non "market participant" is not meant to imply 
that it is participating in a "non market." As will be explained, it is meant to 
imply that government cannot participate in the "religion market." I employ this 
language to maintain symmetry with my use of the "market participant" 
metaphor found in the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. If the 
reader prefers to substitute the phrase "market non-participant" throughout, I 
have no objection. I thank Professor Douglas Laycock for suggesting this 
clarification. 
12 A major factor spurring the reassessment of the Court's religion clause 
jurisprudence was the sheer number of state cases that resulted from 
incorporation. For "incorporation" of the First Amendment, see Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause into 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) and Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Ewing TP, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause 
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
13 
 See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of 
separation between Church and State" (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)), referencing Jefferson's phrase of "building a wall of 
separation between church and state" because "[c]oming as this does from an 
acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure [the First Amendment], it 
may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of 
the amendment thus secured."). 
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interposed between church and state, which protects other norms 
assumed to prescribe the behavior of parties on both sides of the 
wall. The prescription to be followed under this metaphor is no 
breaching the wall—not even "the slightest breach"14—for the 
good and the protection of both church and state. Proscribing all 
contacts between church and state will presumably protect both 
civil liberties "from religious interference" and religious liberties 
"from the invasions of the civil authority."15 On whichever side of 
the wall of separation we find ourselves, the prescription will 
safeguard the "good" to be found on our side. 
It cannot be overstated how much the adoption of this 
metaphor significantly advanced the Court's religion clause 
jurisprudence, especially in the field of free exercise. Prior case 
law had allowed government to ban outright central religious 
tenets and practices upon a deferential finding that they were 
"subversive of good order."16 The Court now correctly recognizes 
that government regulation of the exercise of religion requires the 
same heightened justification employing a compelling interest and 
the use of the least restrictive means applicable to other 
fundamental interests." Government regulations of religious 
exercise, both direct and indirect, improperly "breach the wall of 
separation"—and only the most paramount interests will justify 
such incursions.18 
Unfortunately, the metaphor of separation also contains the 
seeds of its own undoing. If the metaphor does not allow 
government to regulate religious exercise because this improperly 
breaches the wall of separation, can government "breach" the wall 
again to lift such regulations once they are in place? Why allow 
one breach but not the other? If the prescription is to allow no 
breaches, then the distinction between the first and second 
14 Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. 
15 Id. at 15 (quoting Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87, 120 
(1843)). 
16 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). For the disturbing 
history of the Court's prior analysis of free exercise, see Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 
145; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). 
17 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718- 
19 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136, 141 
(1987); Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989). 
18 See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 ("[I]n this highly sensitive 
constitutional area, loinly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, 
give occasion for permissible limitation [of free exercise].'" (quoting Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
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("corrective") breaches cannot be justified under the metaphor of 
separation. Indeed, the second "corrective" breach simultaneously 
appears to be prescribed by free exercise and proscribed by 
establishment under the metaphor of separation. The significant 
normative advance in religion clause jurisprudence gained by the 
Court's adoption of the metaphor of separation, which for the first 
time correctly protects the exercise of religion as a fundamental 
right, is now in jeopardy.19 
Furthermore, the metaphor of separation seems to be too blunt 
an instrument for analyzing government "establishment" of 
religion. A plausible reading of the metaphor proscribes every 
form of public aid or support of religion.20 Nevertheless, this is too 
broad a proscription. Although it will safeguard against the historic 
problems associated with government-sanctioned religion, it will 
also entail discrimination against religion in cases where 
government aid or support is universally available.21 Notions of 
19 See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 415 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he 
Establishment Clause as construed by this Court not only permits but 
affirmatively requires South Carolina equally to deny the appellant's claim for 
unemployment compensation [because] . . . the Establishment Clause forbids 
`every form of public aid or support for religion.'"). 
Justice O'Connor recognizes this conflict between the demands of 
disestablishment and the demands of free exercise under the metaphor of 
separation when she writes, "[i]t is disingenuous to look for a purely secular 
purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise 
of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden. Instead, the Court should 
simply acknowledge that the religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by 
the Free Exercise Clause." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). For an extended treatment of this argument, see also 
James Beattie, Taking Liberalism and Religious Liberty Seriously: Shifting Our 
Notion of Toleration from Locke to Mill, 43 CATH. LAW. 367, 370, 398-99 
(2004). 
20 See, e.g., Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963) (where the 
majority opinion embraces the extreme separationist reasoning of Justice 
Rutledge's dissent in Everson, stating, "[t]he [First] Amendment's purpose . . . 
was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious 
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public 
aid or support for religion.") (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting). 
21 See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 ("language of the [first] amendment 
commands that [government] cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of 
their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual[s] . . . because of 
their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare 
legislation.") (emphasis added). 
As public welfare legislation has grown in the past century, so has the 
potential conflict between the prescriptions (and proscriptions) of establishment 
and free exercise under the metaphor of separation. Compare Justice 
Rehnquist's insight when he writes, "the growth of the social welfare legislation 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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fairness and respect for fundamental rights require that only certain 
types of public aid and support to religion be proscribed by 
religion clause jurisprudence, but the metaphor of separation 
cannot justify making such a distinction. 
Finally, the symmetrical nature of the metaphor of separation 
does not track the asymmetrical language of the constitutional text. 
The constitutional text places restrictions only on government,22 
but the metaphor of separation places restrictions on both 
government and religion. Neither government nor religion can 
enter the other's domain. This dual restriction has a potentially 
pernicious consequence. It potentially justifies barring the religious 
voter and candidate from participation in political processes.23 Any 
legal norm with such potentially discriminatory consequences to 
our fundamental civil liberties should give us pause. 
Over time, members of the Court have voiced concerns similar 
to those I have raised.24 Partly because of the normative 
inadequacies of the metaphor of separation, and partly because of a 
change in the membership of the Court, by the late 1980s the use 
of the metaphor of separation slowly declined in the Court's 
religion clause jurisprudence.25  
during the latter part of the 20th century has greatly magnified the potential for 
conflict between the two Clauses, since such legislation touches the individual at 
so many points in his life." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
22 See supra note 1. 
23 See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 ("Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa.") (emphasis added). 
24 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988) (stating that 
monitoring the federal monies for the Adolescent Family Life Act in order to 
avoid advancement of religion "presents us with another 'Catch-22' argument: 
the very supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders 
the statute invalid."). 
25 This is not to say that the metaphor of separation no longer plays an 
important part in the Court's religion clause jurisprudence; it does. On the free 
exercise front, the decline of the metaphor of separation probably is more 
pronounced by both the limitation of the Sherbert test to its facts and the 
acceptance of the new doctrinal test for free exercise in Employment Div. v. 
Smith. However, with regards to establishment, if the Lemon test arguably 
embraces the separation metaphor, and I believe that it does, then the metaphor 
of separation still survives in the Court's religion clause jurisprudence because 
Lemon has not been overruled—at least not yet. See, e.g., McCreary County v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859-61 (2005) (basing the holding on the Lemon test) and 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (setting forth the Lemon test). 
Additionally, there have been attempts to correct some of the doctrinal 
difficulties with the metaphor of separation by, for example, "folding" the 
entanglement prong of Lemon into the effects prong. See, e.g., Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) and Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 
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B. Neutrality 
For the last 25 years or so, a new metaphor for religion clause 
jurisprudence is taking center stage.26 It is the metaphor of 
"neutrality." Because the metaphor of separation can also lay claim 
to being "neutral,"27 the new metaphor further specifies that it is 
government neutrality between religion and non-religion that is 
prescribed. The new metaphor prescribes that government 
relationships with religion are justified constitutionally if (1) they 
are intended to aid or support non-religion and (2) they treat 
(affect) religion and non-religion in the same way, or 
"evenhandedly," in cases where religion is involved.28 The recent 
case law implies that if the second condition is met, then the first 
condition can be presumed.29 If government actions essentially 
ignore the religious aspects of a situation, as demonstrated by their 
(2000). Of course, this move does not solve all of the difficulties with the 
doctrinal implementation of the metaphor of separation mentioned above, e.g., 
the "tension" between free exercise and establishment under the metaphor. 
26 There is an ongoing debate in the literature about whether the Court's use 
of a central metaphor is "transitional," as I describe it, or "unitary." See, e.g., 
Carl Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-
Based Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing for the "transitional" 
position) and Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and 
Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 43 (1997) (arguing for the "unitary" position: "I 
believe the Supreme Court has thought itself committed to both separation and 
neutrality, and that separation and neutrality are two aspects of a consistent 
understanding of religious liberty."). 
Far be it from me to quash any attempt to render the Court's decisions in 
this area more consistent. The main difficulty I have with the "unitary" position, 
however, is that the normative implications of the two metaphors are not 
consistent. Even Professor Laycock concedes that "unity" of the two metaphors 
is only made possible by a "variable choice between the two baselines" of the 
two metaphors. Id. at 70. Accordingly, we need an additional normative 
justification for a "choice" between prescriptions not justified by the 
prescriptions of the two metaphors themselves. On balance, the "unitary" 
position supplants the two metaphors of separation and neutrality with a new 
central metaphor, as do I, rather than unifies them "consistently." 
27 For example, proscribing every form of government aid or support of 
religion is arguably "neutral" between religions. It may be wrongheaded, but it 
is arguably neutral. 
28 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) ("A 
central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding 
governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their 
neutrality towards religion . . . . We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is 
respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and 
evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and 
vie oints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse."). 
9 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
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evenhanded treatment of religion and non-religion, then 
government actions remain neutral and are constitutionally 
permissible.3°  
The new metaphor of neutrality, or evenhandedness, like the 
metaphor of separation before it, provides courts with powerful 
normative imagery. It conjures images suggesting the normative 
pull of the rule of law under which "like cases are treated alike."31  
And it suggests comparisons to equal treatment under the law 
found in the Equal Protection Clause.32 
We are still in the early throes of this new central metaphor. 
The metaphor's implications for understanding the proper legal 
and political relationships between government and religion have 
3° Id. The plurality writes: 
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is 
attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have 
consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid 
that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without 
regard to their religion. If the religious, irreligious, and 
areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one 
would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular 
recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the 
government. 
See also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983) (emphasis in original): 
Other characteristics of [a tax deduction for parents 
sending their children to parochial schools] argue equally 
strongly for the provision's constitutionality. Most 
importantly, the deduction is available for educational 
expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose 
children attend public schools and those whose children attend 
non-sectarian private schools or sectarian schools. Just as in 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), where we concluded 
that the state's provision of a forum neutrally open to a broad 
class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers does not 
confer any imprimatur of State approval, so here: the 
provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an 
important index of secular effect. 
31 See, e.g., DALE A. NANCE, LAW AND JUSTICE: CASES AND READINGS ON 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 143 (2d ed. 1999) ("One of the core instincts 
that most people share is the idea that justice, whatever else it may be, entails 
the requirement of equality. It is often articulated by the maxim, 'Treat like 
cases alike,' with the implication that one should also, 'Treat different cases 
differently.'"). 
32 For example, the Court partially justifies employing its new metaphor in 
the field of free exercise by stressing its compatibility with equal protection 
analysis. Citing to equal protection precedents, the Court states, "[o]ur 
conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of 
burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest is the only approach compatible with these precedents." 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). 
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not been fully worked out.33 Nevertheless, the early indications are 
not good. 
The most troubling consequence of the Court's adoption of the 
new metaphor of neutrality is the loss of the compelling interest 
test in the vast majority of cases involving government regulation 
of religious exercise.34 "Our conclusion [is] that generally 
applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest."35 The Court reaches this conclusion 
because "generally applicable, religion-neutral" laws conform to 
the prescriptions of the metaphor of neutrality. Such laws are 
intended to further non-religious interests and they treat (read 
"burden") non-religious and religious practices in the same way—
that is, they are "evenhanded."36 
Unfortunately, this conclusion undermines the significant 
normative gains achieved under the metaphor of separation, which 
correctly protected the exercise of religion as a fundamental right. 
The new test harkens back to a prior period of religion clause 
jurisprudence in which the Court showed great deference to 
33 For example, the metaphor establishes the constitutional permissibility of 
government providing "equal aid" to religion and non-religion. But does the 
metaphor also prescribe that government is required to provide such aid? In the 
context of funding speech, the answer appears to be "yes." See Rosenberger v. 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). In the context of other funding, the answer 
appears to be "no." See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2001). 
34 The compelling interest test is still applied in the few cases in which 
government intentionally discriminates against religious practice: cases in which 
government regulations are specifically directed at the practice because the 
practice is religious, or cases in which government has enacted a system of 
individual exemptions but refuses to extend that system to qualifying individuals 
because of their religion. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. The Court also distinguishes 
the holding in Yoder by recasting it as a "hybrid situation" in which free exercise 
interests are conjoined to other fundamental interests that by themselves would 
receive heightened scrutiny. Id at 881-82. In such "hybrid" cases, the Court is 
not clear whether it is the free exercise interest that receives the heightened 
scrutiny or the other fundamental interest to which it is conjoined. 
35 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3. See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) ("[O]ur cases establish the general 
proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental 
effect of burdening a particular religious practice."). 
36 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 ("It is a permissible reading of the text . . . to say 
that if the prohibiting the [free] exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the 
[regulation] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and 
otherwise valid provision [i.e., the regulation treats religion and non-religion in 
the same way], the First Amendment has not been offended."). 
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government regulations of religious exercise.37 Now, government 
need only demonstrate that its regulation does not target religion 
and that its regulation applies to everyone, to religious and non-
religious practices alike. The presumption that government must 
justify regulations of religious exercise by only the most 
paramount interests and by the employment of the least restrictive 
means, similar to the presumption pertaining to government's 
regulation of other fundamental interests, is gone. With the loss of 
this presumption comes the loss of fundamental status under our 
constitutional system. 
Perhaps realizing the significance of this troubling result, the 
Court attempts to reassure religious practitioners by providing 
another option for protection of religious exercise. Although the 
constitutional status of free exercise is no longer fundamental, the 
Constitution permits statutory protections where these can be 
enacted.38 The Court candidly concedes that this lone avenue of 
protection places minority religions—those religions without the 
necessary political clout—at a distinct disadvantage. The Court 
writes: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation 
[of free exercise] to the political process will place 
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices 
that are not widely engaged in; but that [is the] 
unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government . . .39 
Of course, the constitutional text makes no such distinction 
between religious practices "widely engaged in" and those that are 
not. Presumably, the constitutional protections of free exercise 
apply to all religious practices. Certainly,, other constitutional 
protections of fundamental interests have not drawn on this 
distinction, and there is no good reason to draw such a distinction 
here.°  In the worst light, the metaphor of neutrality sacrifices the 
37 It is not surprising that the Court cites to Reynolds with approval, for the 
Court has returned to the deferential standard employed in this prior period of 
religion clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., id. at 885. 
38 Id. at 894 ("Values that are protected against government interference 
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the 
political process."). 
39 Id 
ao Compare Justice Jackson when he writes: 
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to 
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fundamental status of free exercise under our constitutional 
system. In the best light, it sacrifices denominational neutrality 
between religions in order to gain neutrality between religious and 
non-religious practices. There is little to recommend in taking such 
a normative stance. 
Turning to the metaphor's application in the area of 
establishment, it appears to be faring much better, at least in the 
area of public aid. The metaphor does not proscribe every form of 
public aid of religion, and in this sense it provides a potentially 
better-tuned analysis of government aid of religion than found 
under the metaphor of separation. The new metaphor potentially 
avoids discrimination against religion in cases where government 
aid is universally available.41 However, a significant question 
remains: does the new metaphor require such aid of religion in 
cases where government aid is universally available, or does the 
metaphor merely permit it?42 Again, our notions of fairness and 
respect for fundamental rights require that discrimination against 
religion be avoided in all cases where this is possible. Accordingly, 
in cases where government aid is universally available, it should be 
required that no distinction be drawn between religion and non-
religion. 
Finally, there is the concern of how the new metaphor applies 
to government support of religion, specifically in the area of 
government religious speech. If government expression supports a 
particular religious viewpoint, is neutrality maintained by 
offsetting non-religious government expression or by government 
expression of many (all?) religious viewpoints? The former 
requirement will potentially always be met and might allow 
persistent, ongoing government support for a particular religious 
viewpoint to the exclusion of other religious viewpoints, as long as 
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. 
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free 
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend 
on the outcome of no elections. 
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
41 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
42 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The correct answer to this 
question becomes all the more urgent when combined with the metaphor's 
treatment of free exercise. If burdens on free exercise are generally permitted 
under the Smith doctrine and benefits to religion are not generally required under 
Locke's rationale, then we are left with the potential characterization of the 
"proper" relationship between government and religion as little more than 
government hostility towards religion, where it is permissible for government to 
levy burdens on religion without the offsetting benefits to religion. 
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government also engages in non-religious expression. This hardly 
appears "evenhanded." The latter requirement potentially will be 
seldom met, if ever. As powerful as the message of government 
speech is, it is not of unlimited duration. Time constraints on 
government expression make the latter requirement a near 
impossibility. 
The current case law under the metaphor of neutrality has not 
solved this problem, settling instead for permitting government 
religious speech that supports the religious expression of "[t]he 
three most popular religions in the United States, Christianity, 
Judaism, and Islam—which combined account for 97.7% of all 
believers,"43 or, allowing government religious speech because it 
has ties to our nation's history.44 The former option, even if 
accurate, cannot explain why the metaphor of neutrality permits 
government support of only majority religious expression; the 
latter option cannot explain why the metaphor of neutrality permits 
government support of only historic religious expression. Neither 
option pays more than mere lip service to the prescriptions 
underlying the metaphor of neutrality or evenhandedness. Thus far, 
the Court's application of the metaphor of neutrality has not solved 
the proper relationship between government and religion in the 
area of government religious expression. 
II. NON "MARKET PARTICIPANT" AS THE CENTRAL 
METAPHOR OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
Before I set out my proposal for a new central metaphor for 
religion clause jurisprudence, addressing a few preliminary 
considerations is in order. First, I have taken some pains 
throughout this article to use the phrase "religion clause 
jurisprudence." The use of this expression is meant to avoid a 
common misunderstanding in this area of law. Although the 
constitutional text is composed of two clauses separated by a 
comma,45 we should not assume that different interests are 
embodied in the two clauses. Neither should we make additional 
assumptions that these different interests are pitted against one 
43 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
" Id. at 893 ("[I]t is entirely clear from our Nation's historical practices that 
the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in 
unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists."). 
45 See supra note 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss2/1
[VOL. 2.164 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 178 
another, nor that a proper reading of text allows for the 
interpretation of one of the interests or clauses without interpreting 
the other.46 The metaphor of non "market participant" prescribes 
that both clauses are directed at achieving the same unitary 
interest—the protection and preservation of religious liberty.47 The 
reason for two clauses rather than one is that each clause prescribes 
a particular set of duties for government but all government duties 
are aimed at achieving the unitary interest of religious liberty. Both 
sets of duties must be followed by government in order to achieve 
the same fundamental interest of religious liberty for its citizens.48  
The phrase "religion clause jurisprudence" is employed throughout 
the article in order to emphasize this unitary interest. 
Second, if the religious liberty of citizens is the unitary goal of 
religion clause jurisprudence, then the correlative government 
duties required to achieve that goal must apply to all citizens 
without additional qualification. A proposed metaphor that 
prescribes additional qualifications for citizens to claim the 
protection of the correlative government duties, such as requiring 
some citizens to possess additional political clout, is thus 
46 For an extended discussion of the problems that result from a 
"disaggregated" reading of the Religion Clauses, see Douglas Laycock, Formal, 
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEFAUL L. 
REV. 993, 1007-11 (1990). 
47 Justice Brennan perhaps best captures the "unitary" understanding of 
religion clause jurisprudence when he discusses the fallacy in the contention that 
there are two different interests contained in the two clauses: 
The fallacy in this contention, I think, is that it underestimates 
the role of the Establishment Clause as a coguarantor, with the 
Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty. The Framers did not 
entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone. 
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
48 The use of the plural "sets of duties" is intended to avoid another serious 
misunderstanding in the discussion of rights. Often rights are characterized as 
either "negative" or "positive" depending upon whether the correlative duty 
(singular) they justify requires the non-interference (negative) or the assistance 
(positive) of others to the rights-holder. This distinction breaks down on close 
inspection. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THEORIES OF RIGHTS 4-12 (1989); 
JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL RIGHTS 24-25, 63-87 (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 165-92 (1986). All rights ground or justify both 
negative (non-interference) and positive (protection and aid) correlative duties—
it is the duties which are "negative" or "positive," not the rights. See, e.g., 
HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS 53 (2d ed. 1980) ("the common notion that rights 
can be divided into rights of forbearance (so-called negative rights) . . . and 
rights to aid (so-called positive rights), is thoroughly misguided. . . . It is duties, 
not rights, that can be divided among avoidance and aid, and protection. And—
this is what matters—every basic right entails duties of all three types."). 
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disqualified as a normatively inadequate metaphor for religion 
clause jurisprudence. 
Finally, a proposed metaphor should track the asymmetrical 
nature of the constitutional text. The constitutional text laces 
restrictions (duties) only on government, not on religion. The 
proposed metaphor of non "market participant" does the same. 
B. The Metaphor of Non "Market Participant" 
The metaphor of non "market participant" essentially combines 
two metaphors, found elsewhere in constitutional jurisprudence, 
with one important qualification. First, it references the famous 
metaphor of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: the metaphor 
portraying free speech protections as a "marketplace of ideas." 
Similar to Justice Holmes's suggestion that the constitutional 
protections afforded free speech can be understood best as a 
"market" in which there is "free trade in ideas,"5° the proposed 
metaphor for religion clause jurisprudence suggests that the 
constitutional protections afforded religious liberty can be 
understood best as a "market" in which there is "free trade" in 
religion. 
The metaphor does not require that the citizens who are 
participating in the "religion market" view themselves as 
participating in such a market, or that they view their religious 
"trade" as similar to trade in other commodities.51 For most 
adherents, nothing could be further from the truth. Moreover, the 
metaphor is not concerned with the motivation behind the behavior 
of the participants within the "religion market." It is not wedded to 
49 See supra note 1. 
5° Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). Holmes's powerful imagery is worth repeating: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe 
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. 
51 Throughout the following discussion I shall use the noun "citizen" to 
emphasize the "political" obligations placed upon government under the non 
"market participant" metaphor. Of course, the same protections apply to all 
"persons" participating in the "religion market," including religious 
organizations, under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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any particular theory of market behavior, such as classical or 
behavioral economic theory. All this is beside the main point. 
The main point is that government, not citizens, must view the 
religious liberty of its citizens as if there is a "religion market" in 
which private citizens trade, act, and choose their religious beliefs 
and lifestyles for themselves. Government must recognize these 
private orderings, choices, and actions as solely determinative of 
the outcomes of the market.52 In other words, government is placed 
under a set of duties to avoid interference with, and to provide 
protection for, the citizen competitors in the "religion market." The 
metaphor prescribes a general presumption that government shall 
make no law "prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 
Several contemporary writers have previously stressed the 
central importance of private ordering in religion clause 
jurisprudence. For example, Professor Douglas Laycock writes: 
[T]he religion clauses require government to 
minimize the extent to which it either encourages or 
discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or 
nonpractice, observance or nonobservance . . . . But 
I must elaborate on what I mean by minimizing 
encouragement and discouragement. I mean that 
religion is to be left as wholly to private choice as 
anything can be. It should proceed as unaffected by 
government as possible.53  
The metaphor of non "market participant" requires government 
to avoid interference with, and to provide protection for, the citizen 
competitors in the "religion market" and, thereby, also requires 
that religion is to be left to the private orderings of the citizen 
competitors as much as possible. 
52 Additionally, the metaphor of non "market participant" is not wedded to 
any particular outcome in the "religion market," as many have assumed Justice 
Holmes's "marketplace of ideas" was wedded to the outcome of "truth." 
Obviously, the metaphor of non "market participant" would not allow 
government to direct the market towards any particular outcome of its liking. 
53 Laycock, supra note 46, at 1001-02. See also Professor Michael 
McConnell when he writes: "The unifying principle [of the Religion Clauses] is 
that the religious life of the people should be insulated, to the maximum degree 
possible, from the effect of governmental action, whether favorable or 
unfavorable." Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 329, 331-32 (1991). I am not claiming, of course, that these 
scholars would agree with my conception of non "market participant" or with 
my suggested implementation of the metaphor in section III. 
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Of course, there may be situations in which government is 
justified in regulating the private orderings of the "religion 
market." But again Justice Holmes should be our guide: "We 
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught 
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law."54 In 
the context of religion clause jurisprudence, only the most 
paramount government interests and the use of the least restrictive 
means will justify governmental incursions into the "religion 
market" to regulate citizen competitors. When it comes to the 
protection of the free exercise of citizens, viewed as competitors in 
the "free trade" of religion, the metaphor of non "market 
participant" places government once again under the prescriptions 
(and proscriptions) of the compelling interest test. 
Turning to establishment, the metaphor of non "market 
participant" also draws upon the metaphor of "market participant" 
found in the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but 
with an important difference.55 The Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine of market participant affords states (the legal fiction of) 
private competitor status in the market and thereby exempts states 
from the usual limitations placed on their regulatory powers of the 
market.56 
The important difference is that the non "market participant" 
metaphor denies such an exemption to government because it bars 
government from competitor status in the "religion market." Only 
citizen orderings, choices, and actions should determine the 
outcomes of the market. The metaphor of non "market participant" 
interprets the constitutional text that government "shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion" as expressly 
54 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
55 See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); White v. Mass. Council of Constr. 
Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983); S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural 
Res. of Alaska, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
56 See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-38 ("The basic distinction drawn in 
Alexandria Scrap between States as market participants and States as market 
regulators makes good sense and sound law. As that case explains, the 
Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures 
impeding free private trade in the national market. There is no indication of a 
constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely 
in the free market . . . . Restraint in this area is also counseled by . . . 'the long 
recognized right of a trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private 
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with 
whom he will deal.'") (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 
(1919)). 
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proscribing actions in which government enters the "religion 
market" as a competitor.57 When government does enter the 
"religion market" as a competitor, only the most paramount 
interests and the employment of the least restrictive means will 
justify such incursions. 
The metaphor of non "market participant" prescribes therefore 
a general presumption, with correlative sets of duties, that both 
prevents government from regulating the behavior of citizen 
competitors in the market (free exercise) and prevents government 
from becoming a competitor or engaging in competitor behavior in 
the market (establishment). Both sets of governmental duties, not 
to regulate competitors and not to be a competitor, are aimed at 
achieving the single goal of maximal religious liberty for citizens. 
C. Preliminary Comparisons 
The following section shall address in greater detail how the 
metaphor of non "market participant" should be applied in free 
exercise and establishment cases, but a few preliminary 
comparisons with the Court's historic metaphors are in order here. 
The metaphor of non "market participant" returns the compelling 
interest test to its rightful place in free exercise jurisprudence. In 
this regard, the proposed metaphor sides with the prescriptions of 
separation and not neutrality. However, the metaphor of non 
"market participant" avoids pitting the prescriptions of free 
exercise and establishment against one another. Under both sets of 
duties, government is directed to take whatever actions are 
necessary to get out and to stay out of the "religion market." 
The metaphor of non "market participant" analyzes 
establishment through the lens of government engaging in 
57 Compare Justice O'Connor's insights when she writes: 
Our Founders conceived of a Republic receptive to voluntary 
religious expression . . . . Voluntary religious belief and 
expressions may be as threatened when government takes the 
mantle of religion upon itself as when government directly 
interferes with private religious practice. . . . In the 
marketplace of ideas, the government has vast resources and 
special status. Government religious expression therefore risks 
crowding out private observance and distorting the natural 
interplay between competing beliefs. Allowing government to 
be a potential mouthpiece for competing religious ideas risks 
the sort of division that might easily spill over into 
suppression of rival beliefs. 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
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"competitor" behavior in the "religion market." If government is 
competing in another market, however, say providing bus fare to 
all students, then the metaphor of non "market participant" is not 
necessarily violated. In cases where public aid or support is made 
universally available, government provides a prima facie 
justification that it is not competing in the "religion market" under 
the metaphor of non "market participant." Accordingly, in cases in 
which public aid is universally available, the metaphor of non 
"market participant" sides with the prescriptions of neutrality and 
not separation. 
Finally, the metaphor of non "market participant" generally 
proscribes government religious speech, at least where it cannot be 
justified by the most paramount interests and the employment of 
the least restrictive means. Government religious speech is prima 
facie "competitor" behavior in the "religion market."58 Thus far, 
the justifications proffered by the metaphor of neutrality, the 
historical pedigree and the majoritarian scope of government 
religious speech, are neither compelling nor least restrictive. On 
this issue, therefore, the metaphor of non "market participant" 
sides with the prescriptions of separation and not neutrality, but 
perhaps for different reasons. 
58 On this issue, the metaphor of non "market participant" cannot explicitly 
draw on the implications of Justice Holmes's "marketplace of ideas." In the free 
speech context, government is also a participant in the market. Of course, there 
is no constitutional text in free speech similar to the disestablishment language 
in religion clause jurisprudence. Compare Justice Kennedy's observation when 
he writes: 
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite 
different mechanisms. Speech is protected by ensuring its full 
expression even when the government participates, for the 
very object of some of our most important speech is to 
persuade the government to adopt an idea as its own. The 
method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom of 
conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In 
religious debate or expression the government is not a prime 
participant, for the Framers deemed religious establishment 
antithetical to the freedom of all . . . . [T]he Establishment 
Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention 
in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech 
provisions. 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992). The metaphor of non "market 
participant" adds the prescription to Justice Kennedy's analysis that government 
should not participate in religious debate or expression, unless it can be justified 
by paramount interests and the least restrictive means. 
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III. HOW THE METAPHOR OF NON "MARKET 
PARTICIPANT" SHOULD APPLY IN FREE EXERCISE AND 
ESTABLISHMENT CASES 
A. Non "Market Participant" and Free Exercise 
Fortunately, there is significant guidance for how the metaphor 
of non "market participant" should apply to free exercise: courts 
are already applying it, or something very close to it, in cases 
involving federal statutory law.59 Shortly after the Supreme Court 
moved to its new neutrality metaphor for free exercise, Congress 
responded and enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) in an attempt "to restore" protection for religious liberty in 
the free exercise context.60 Under RFRA, as currently 
59 Additionally, eighteen states apply "heightened scrutiny" to free exercise 
claims either through enactments of state "mini-RFRAs" or through existing 
state constitutional provisions, which have been interpreted to require the 
compelling interest standard or something like it. For state "mini-RFRAs," see 
Alabama Religious Freedom Restoration Amendment, ALA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 3.01; Arizona Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-
1493 (LexisNexis 1998); Connecticut Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571(b) (1993); Florida Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-761.05 (1998); Idaho Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-401 (1999); Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 35/1 (1998); Missouri Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.302 (2003); New Mexico Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (West 2000); 
Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, 51 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §§ 251-258 
(2000); Rhode Island Religious Freedom Restoration Act, R.I. GEN LAWS § 42-
80.1-1 (1993); South Carolina Religious Freedom Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-
32-30 to 1-32-60 (1999); Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, TEX. CIV. 
FRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 110.001-110.012 (Vernon 1999). For state 
constitutional provisions applying the compelling interest standard, see Attorney 
General v. Desilets, 636 N.E. 2d 233 (Mass. 1994); People v. DeJonge, 501 
N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); 
Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000); First Covenant Church v. 
City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 
(Wis. 1996). 
Moreover, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000 ("RLUIPA") also applies the compelling interest standard to state land use 
regulations and to state regulations of free exercise for institutionalized persons. 
See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc). The Court has upheld 
the application of section 3 of RLUIPA to state prisoners' free exercise. See 
Cutter v. Wilkson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
60 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)). 
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understood,61 the federal government may not, as a statutory 
matter, "substantially burden" a person's religious exercise "even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability."62 The 
only exception recognized by the statute requires the federal 
government to satisfy the compelling interest test, to 
"demonstrat[e] that the application of the burden to the person (1) 
is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest."63  
1. The Citizen Competitor's Prima Facie Case 
The Court's latest analysis of RFRA identifies three 
components of a free exercise prima facie case: the demonstration 
of "a [1] substantial governmental burden to [2] sincere, [3] 
religious exercise."64 Taking the last two components first, the 
Court holds that because "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation,"65 nor do they sit as heresy tribunals,66 courts 
"should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs [or practices]."67 
Moreover, because religious exercise "need not be acceptable, 
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others,"68 or "shared by 
all of the members of a religious sect,"69 or "compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief,"70 courts generally should 
give considerable credence to the petitioner's understanding of 
61 As originally enacted, RFRA applied to states as well as the Federal 
Government. In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court held the statute's application 
to states was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's Section 5 enforcement 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 532 (1997). 
62 
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
64 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal (UDV), 546 
U.S. 418, 428 (2006). 
65 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). 
66 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). 
67 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. 
68 1d. at 714. 
69 1d. at 715-16. 
70 Congress subsequently clarified the statutory meaning of "religious 
exercise" under RFRA to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." See Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 
803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) (amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) of 
RFRA to read "[r]eligious exercise" includes "any exercise of religion, whether 
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 
2000cc-5(7)(A)). 
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what constitutes her "religious exercise." Finally, courts should 
determine the sincerity of religious belief by only making a finding 
of "honest conviction" on the part of the petitioner.71  
The wide latitude given the petitioner, on both the scope of 
religious practice and the sincerity of religious belief, is the 
unsurprising result of establishment concerns that would ensue if 
courts were to hold otherwise. This judicial latitude also properly 
tracks the prescriptions (and proscriptions) of the non "market 
participant" metaphor. The metaphor generally prescribes 
government non-interference with citizen beliefs, actions, and 
orderings in the "religion market," and proscribes government 
engaging in "competitor" behavior in the market, such as 
government staking out a position on the proper contours of the 
market. Of course, even the Court recognizes that "[o]ne can . . . 
imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in 
motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free 
Exercise Clause."72 But in cases that are not "bizarre," the 
petitioner is given a wide berth to establish both what constitutes 
her religious exercise and her sincerity. 
The main concern for courts at this pleading stage is therefore 
the determination of what constitutes a "substantial" burden; 
unfortunately, RFRA is silent as to this. The only guidance given is 
in the House Report accompanying RFRA, which states "an 
expectation" that "the courts will look to [] religion cases decided 
prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether or not religious 
exercise has been burdened."73 The pre-Smith case law essentially 
holds that two types of government regulation create "substantial" 
burdens: government regulations that render religious practice 
unlawful or illega1,74 and government regulations that tend to 
coerce actions contrary to religious practice. 15 
71 Thomas, 450 U.S at 716. 
72 1d. at 715. 
73 H.R. REP. No. 88-103, at 6-7 (1993). 
74 See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (petitioner 
presents a prima facie case for substantial burden when the regulation "make[s] 
unlawful any religious practices of [petitioner]" or results in the "serious . . . 
choice [of] forsaking their religious practices or subjecting themselves to 
criminal prosecution"). 
75 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 
451 (1988) (while acknowledging that a government logging road built through 
a ceremonial mountain site will "virtually destroy . . . Indians' ability to practice 
their religion," the Court states that the government's actions did not present a 
prima facie case of substantial burden because they had "no tendency to coerce 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs"). 
An additional gambit employed in pre-Smith case law was to define 
"substantial" by "central," i.e., the more "central" a practice is to a religion, 
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What if the regulation does not criminalize religious exercise 
or tend to coerce contrary actions, but indirectly, or incidentally, 
renders religious practice impossible? Surprisingly, the 
understanding of burden in pre-Smith case law arguably did not 
extend this far.76 Nevertheless, it is counter-intuitive to hold that 
government's creation of conditions, resulting in the impossibility 
for rights-holders to effectuate their rights, is not (at least 
presumptively) a substantial burden on those rights. Another way 
of stating this: if the metaphor of non "market participant" starts 
from the constitutional presumption of government duties of non-
interference with, and protection for, free exercise, then 
government regulations rendering the exercise impossible violate 
the proper constitutional presumption. Any adequate understanding 
of a prima facie case of "substantial" burden must include this type 
of burden. 
Furthermore, RFRA never addresses discriminatory burdens on 
free exercise in cases where the impact of such burdens might be 
fairly insignificant.77 Most courts that have addressed this issue 
conclude, correctly I believe, that discriminating burdens are to be 
included under RFRA's heightened scrutiny, even in cases where 
the effect of these burdens may not be substantia1.78  
Finally, some authors have suggested "secular" proxies for 
analyzing burdens in the context of free exercise. For example, it 
then, if the practice is burdened, the more "substantial" the burden is to a 
religion. The difficulty associated with this approach is that it undermines the 
correct analysis that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation." See 
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. On the question of "centrality," the Smith Court 
essentially got it right. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) 
("What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's 
assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?"). Even Justice 
Brennan, who proposed a "centrality" analysis of burden, eventually conceded 
that courts should not decide the issue of "centrality" but rather petitioners 
"would be the arbiters of which practices are central to their faith." Lyng, 485 
U.S. at 475 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
76 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450. 
77 For example, a regulation charging parochial students, but not public 
school students, an additional dollar per week to ride the bus to and from school. 
78 See, e.g., Brown v. Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(mentioning that RFRA's substantiality threshold does not reference 
discriminatory burdens but holding that, nevertheless, RFRA's compelling 
interest standard does apply to such burdens). The Smith Court was not wrong in 
identifying discriminating regulations as substantial burdens. See supra note 34 
and accompanying text. However, it was wrong in identifying discriminating 
regulations as the only substantial burdens on free exercise. Even the Smith 
Court recognized that this constricted understanding of burden would not apply 
to most government regulations of religious exercise. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 
("no case of ours has involved the point"). 
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has been suggested that courts could reference a doctrine from free 
speech and look to "the availability of adequate alternative" 
religious practice in order to gauge the substantiality of the burden 
on free exercise.79 This proxy may work for regulations that 
effectively render free exercise impossible. By anyone's definition 
of "adequate alternatives," there are no "adequate" alternatives 
where there are no alternatives at all. If government regulates free 
exercise rendering performance impossible, or vastly more 
difficult, reference to the lack of adequate alternative practice does 
seem to establish a substantial burden on free exercise. 
The concern with this suggested proxy, however, is that it 
assumes there might be adequate alternative practice in the practice 
of religion, similar to the adequate alternative expression of 
speech. I am not convinced of this similarity.80 Religious practice 
is often ritualized in such a manner that every partial act is 
considered essential to the overall significance of the religious 
practice in question. Changing one part of a ritual changes the 
whole ritual. For example, will drinking grapefruit juice be an 
adequate available alternative in the Catholic or Jewish sacraments 
if government regulates all intoxicating substances, including 
wine? Will praying four times a day be an adequate available 
alternative for a Muslim to praying five times a day if government 
regulations would (for some reason) allow for the former but not 
the latter? In both of these examples, I believe a petitioner would 
(correctly) establish a substantial burden on free exercise,81  
although the secular proxy of "adequate alternative" practice may 
find otherwise. 
Another suggestion proposes taking a doctrine usually 
associated with establishment and applying it to the prima facie 
case in free exercise.82 Under the requirement of denominational 
79 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 4, at 1216-17. 
80 Professor Dorf recognizes this problem in citing to Professor Greenawalt, 
who explains that a person "who acts from religious conscience feels he has no 
alternative; a person expressing an idea wants to do so effectively, but probably 
does not feel some inner compulsion to use a particular means." Dorf, supra 
note 4, at 1215 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and 
Canada, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (Winter 1992)). 
81 Under the category of substantial burdens that "tend to coerce actions 
contrary to religious belief" 
82 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 4, at 1217-18 (citing Michael W. McConnell, 
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 
1133-36 (1990)). 
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neutrality, government cannot favor one religion over another.83  
Accordingly, courts could look to see if the burden imposed on a 
particular religious practice is excessive when compared to the 
burden imposed upon other religions having the same practices. If 
so, the lack of denominational neutrality would signal that a 
substantial burden has been placed on the practice in question. The 
limitation on using this "establishment" proxy is, of course, that it 
would only extend to the same religious practices shared by 
different religions, e.g., two religions have a Sabbath day as a 
"common" practice, and only one religion's Sabbath is burdened. 
Otherwise, courts would be comparing apples to oranges. 
Nevertheless, this proxy may potentially capture important 
differences between the burdens government places on minority 
religions versus majority religions in cases where these religions 
have the same practices.'4 
To sum up this discussion of "substantial" burden, the 
metaphor of non "market participant" counsels as broad a 
conception of burden as is found in burdens placed upon other 
fundamental interests. Justice Stevens correctly argues that "a 
[government]-imposed burden on the exercise of a constitutional 
right is measured both by its effects and by its character . . . [i.e.,] 
either because the burden is too severe or it lacks a legitimate, 
rational justification."85 Accordingly, the non "market participant" 
metaphor recognizes the following "substantial" burdens: 
(1) burdens that discriminate against religion, 
because they lack "a legitimate, rational 
justification"; 86 
83 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest 
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot 
be officially preferred over another."). 
84 Compare the "denominational" reasoning in Cutter, where the Court 
dismisses the state's claim of religious favoritism (establishment) if it is required 
to accommodate petitioners' religious service because "[t]he argument, in any 
event, founders on the fact that Ohio already facilitates religious services for 
mainstream faiths." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 n.10 (2005). 
85 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 920 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
" Government regulations that discriminate only against religious exercise 
give rise to the inevitable inference that they are attempting to influence 
religious exercise; this is government "competitor" behavior in the "religion 
market" in its most stark form. Cf. Dorf, supra note 4, at 1184 (targeted 
regulation of rights "represents a kind of structural harm, in the same way 
legislation inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers or beyond the 
powers enumerated in Article I is harmful. These structural limitations serve the 
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(2) burdens that render religious exercise unlawful 
or illegal, because they are "too severe"; 
(3) burdens that coerce (or "tend" to coerce) 
affirmative acts in violation of religious belief, 
because they are "too severe"; 
(4) burdens that render religious exercise 
impossible (or greatly more difficult) because they 
are "too severe"; and, 
(5) burdens that disproportionately burden the same 
religious practice shared by different religions, 
because the burden may be both "too severe" and it 
lacks "a legitimate, rational justification." 
Each of the five listed burdens should constitute a "substantial" 
burden under the metaphor of non"market participant." 
Government regulations imposing such burdens should require 
compelling governmental justification. Often the question of 
burden will be conceded by government.87 But in cases where it is 
not, courts must have as broad a conception of free exercise burden 
as found in the analysis of burdens placed upon our other 
fundamental interests.88 
2. Government's Duty to Demonstrate a Compelling 
Interest and Lease Restrictive Means 
Ample opportunity for a citizen competitor to make her prima 
facie case does not result, however, in a "system in which each 
ultimate purpose of preserving liberty . . . [a harm] in this sense, [is] harmful in 
itself quite apart from the harm it causes to aggrieved individuals."). 
87 See, e.g., Gonzales v. UDV, 546 U.S. 418, 426 (2006) (government 
concedes prima facie case where regulation under the Controlled Substances Act 
of "hoasca," a hallucinogenic substance, resulted in classifying religious 
sacrament as unlawful or illegal). 
88 Perhaps the wide berth given to petitioner's prima facie case under free 
exercise can be viewed in rough equipoise with the lax standing rules for 
petitioner's prima facie case under establishment. In each case, religion is 
treated uniquely but in rough equipoise—allowing fewer procedural hurdles for 
a petitioner's claim of government burden on religion under free exercise and 
fewer procedural hurdles for a petitioner's claim of government benefit to 
religion under establishment. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). If 
this is so, then we should be concerned with the Court's latest foray into 
establishment standing requirements where the Court (arguably) improperly 
adjusts the rough equipoise between free exercise and establishment procedures. 
See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (holding that 
establishment standing requirements do not extend to "executive" expenditures 
for religion but only to "congressional" expenditures for religion). 
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[religious] conscience is a law unto itself."89 The metaphor of non 
"market participant" only prescribes prima facie or presumptive 
protection of private, autonomous religious choice and lifestyle—
not an absolute presumption or right." The presumptive protection 
is defeasible if government can present a countervailing 
compelling interest and demonstrate the use of the least restrictive 
means. Here again, federal statutory law closely comports with the 
non "market participant" metaphor.91  
What constitutes a countervailing governmental "compelling" 
interest? Some writers have suggested that only government's 
protection of another individual right is sufficient to establish a 
compelling interest to regulate a right.92 While this view correctly 
identifies the sufficient conditions required to justify government 
regulations, sufficient conditions are not always necessary. The 
pre-Smith case law can again serve as guide: "only the gravest 
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for 
permissible limitation [of free exercise]."93 Such "paramount" 
interests will include not only the preservation of the rights of 
other citizens," but also the preservation of government,95 as well 
as social and legal institutions,96 through which citizen rights and 
89 On this point, the Smith Court essentially got it wrong. See Employment 
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
9° Cf. Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (rejecting the absolute 
weight of a right not to work on whatever day petitioners designate as their 
Sabbath because it "imposes on employers and [other] employees an absolute 
duty to conform their business practices to the particular religious practices of 
[petitioners]."). See also RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 48, at 165-92 
(discussing the non-absolute nature of rights). 
91 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
92 See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An 
Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 
917 (1988). 
93 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
94 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) ("[t]he 
right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community 
or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death"). 
95 Compare James Madison's defense of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
(1776) when he states: 
[T]hat all men are equally entitled to enjoy the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished 
and unrestrained by the magistrate, Unless the preservation of 
equal liberty [of others] and the existence of the State are 
manifestly endangered. 
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 52 (R.S. Alley ed., Prometheus Books 
1985) (emphasis added). 
" See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("There is no 
doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its 
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interests are protected. Accordingly, the non "market participant" 
metaphor affords government a fairly robust opportunity to argue 
from the protection of other citizen rights, the protection of 
government itself, and the protection of social and legal 
institutions, to demonstrate and establish that the claimed interest 
is a "paramount" or compelling governmental interest. 
If government can demonstrate that paramount interests are 
endangered by private orderings in the "religion market," it must 
then also demonstrate the "impediment to those objectives that 
would flow from recognizing the claimed [religious] exemption."97  
Government will need "to show with [] particularity how its 
admittedly strong interest[s] . . . would be adversely affected by 
granting an exemption[]."" This particularized showing requires 
government both to consider and to articulate its rejection of a 
religious exemption on grounds that allowing the exemption would 
adversely affect or undermine the achievement of the paramount 
interests in question.99 
As burdensome as the employment of the compelling interest 
test may sound in theory, requiring government to demonstrate a 
"paramount" interest and present its "consideration" and an 
articulated, "particularized" rejection of a religious exemption, 
does no more than return free exercise to its proper status as a 
fundamental right. As with the protection of all rights, the real 
danger probably lies in too much government regulation in 
practice. 00 Again, it must be stressed that application of the 
compelling interest test to free exercise claims under the non 
"market participant" metaphor does not result in a "system in 
which each conscience is a law unto itself."101 If government, after 
consideration, can demonstrate that providing an exemption for a 
petitioner's religious exercise would adversely affect or undermine 
a paramount governmental interest—that the interest cannot be 
accomplished in another less restrictive way—courts should not 
grant the requested exemption. The metaphor of non "market 
participant" does prescribe a strong presumption in favor of lifting 
government burdens on citizens in the "religion market"; but this 
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations [on free exercise] for the control and 
duration of basic education."). 
97 Gonzales v. UDV, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 
213, 221 (1972)). 
98 Id. (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236). 
99 Id. at 436 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)). 
mo Cl Dorf, supra note 4, at 1246 ("we feel a strong pull toward sustaining 
government power . . . [w]ithout minimizing the risk of over-enforcement of 
rights . . . the real danger probably lies in the other direction"). 
101 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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presumption is, similar to the presumption of other fundamental 
interests, a rebuttal presumption. 
This brief analysis of how the metaphor of non "market 
participant" should be applied in free exercises cases indicates that 
the prescriptions of the metaphor closely comport with, given a 
few modifications, the current heightened scrutiny provided for 
free exercise under federal statutory law. The risk I run in 
proposing the new metaphor is, of course, that the prescriptions of 
the metaphor would require courts to apply this doctrinal test in 
state law cases, thereby, effectively overruling the current 
constitutional test for state regulations of free exercise prescribed 
under Smith and its progeny. 
B. Non "Market Participant" and Establishment 
The metaphor of non "market participant" interprets the 
constitutional text that government "shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion" as expressly proscribing actions in 
which government either enters the "religion market" as a 
competitor, or engages in "competitor behavior" in that market. As 
a result of its vast resources and its special status, government 
competitor behavior "risks crowding out private observance and 
distorting the natural interplay between competing beliefs."102 
When government actions violate this proscription, only the most 
paramount interests and the employment of the least restrictive 
means will justify such incursions. If government is competing in 
another market, however, then the proscription of the metaphor is 
not necessarily violated. In cases where public aid or support is 
universally available, although religion would also receive the aid 
or support, government provides a prima facie justification that it 
is not competing in the "religion market" under the metaphor of 
non "market participant." °3 
How do courts identify government actions that do engage in 
"competitor behavior" or "breach the close" of the "religion 
market"? Certainly, courts cannot defer to government in 
answering this question. Instead, courts must look either (1) to the 
behavior of citizen competitors in the "religion market" or (2) for 
the hallmark that government is competing in another market, i.e., 
that the government aid or support of religion is also aid or support 
102 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
103 See supra text accompanying notes 57-58. 
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that is universally available.104 If government actions exhibit close 
similarities to the actions of citizens in the "religion market," then 
government actions generally are proscribed by the metaphor of 
non "market participant." If public aid or support of religion is the 
type of aid or support that is not universally available without 
regard to religion, then the aid or support generally is proscribed 
by the metaphor of non "market participant." Again, when 
government actions are proscribed by the metaphor, only the most 
paramount interests and the employment of the least restrictive 
means will justify such incursions. 
In some cases, determining whether particular government 
actions are violations of the metaphor will be a very close call, a 
difficult matter of degree, requiring courts to compare carefully the 
similarities of the actions in question and to gauge carefully the 
general availability of the public aid or support. In other cases, the 
call will be more obvious. Fortunately, the two major areas of 
establishment jurisprudence that will be examined next, 
government religious speech and public aid of religion, tend 
toward more obvious resolutions. 
1. Government Religious Speech 
Government religious speech is one major area in which the 
metaphor of non "market participant" and the metaphor of the 
marketplace of ideas part company. In the area of religion clause 
jurisprudence, government is not a participant in the market in the 
"free trade" in religion. In the area of free speech, government is a 
vital participant in the "free trade of ideas." 05 The reasons for this 
prescriptive difference are fairly easy to discern: first, government 
religious speech, whether prayer, expression, or display, is very 
similar to paradigmatic private "competitor behavior" in the 
"religion market." These actions are very typical of what citizens 
do in the "religion market." To allow government to compete in 
the market, risks distorting citizens' ordering of the outcomes of 
the market. It is for citizens, not government, to pray or not to 
pray, to display or not to display, and to express or not to express 
their religious beliefs. 
Additionally, when government speaks religiously it is 
incapable of speaking without expressing a particular religious 
104 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 105 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
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viewpoint, or viewpoints.106 For citizens in the market, this is not a 
problem; it is part and parcel of what competition in the "religion 
market" is about. But for government it means that the public 
support of the particular religious viewpoint in question is not 
universally available to other religious viewpoints inside, and more 
importantly, other non-religious viewpoints outside the "religion 
market." Government religious speech cannot therefore present a 
prima facie justification that its expression is intended to compete 
in a different market than the "religion market." Government 
religious speech is therefore placed squarely inside the "religion 
market" under both analyses of the non "market participant" 
metaphor. Accordingly, government religious speech must be 
justified by only the most paramount interests and the use of the 
least restrictive means in order to be constitutionally permissible. 
a. Prayer 
The Supreme Court's case law generally proscribing 
government prayer comports with the proscriptions of the 
metaphor.107 Unfortunately, the Court apparently ties its 
proscriptions to the public school setting. Outside of the public 
school context, government prayer is apparently permitted.'°8  
Whether it is the lesser susceptibility of the audience 1" or the 
106 Even those members of the Court who favor certain types of government 
religious speech concede that if it "had to be entirely nondenominational, there 
could be no [government] religion in the public forum at all." See, e.g., 
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead, these 
members settle for the more limited goal of government religious speech 
acknowledging "beliefs widely held among the people of this country." Id. at 
894. 
107 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state may not compose or 
require recitation of public school prayer); Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state cannot require daily Bible reading and recitation of 
the Lord's Prayer in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) 
(striking down statute authorizing moment of silence "for mediation or 
voluntary prayer" where legislative history demonstrated intent to return prayer 
to public schools); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577 (1992) (striking down public 
middle school policy where school officials "direct" and "decide" to perform a 
Benediction that requires student "participation in prayer"); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down public high school policy 
permitting "religious ceremony" at football games). 
1°8 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (permitting legislative chaplain 
to deliver daily prayer). 
1°9 Id. at 792 ("Here, the individual claiming injury by the practice is an 
adult, presumably not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination."). 
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"history and tradition" of the prayer,"° the Court is not clear. 
Nevertheless, government prayer in whatever form or setting 
remains paradigmatic "competitor behavior" under the non 
"market participant" metaphor. If any government action competes 
in the "religion market," government prayer certainly does. 
Accordingly, government must demonstrate a paramount interest 
and the use of the least restrictive means for such incursions. 
Even the Court concedes that a history and tradition of 
violation does not justify current violations of the correlative 
governmental duties not to compete in the "religion market."111  
The Court claims that there is "far more" justification for 
government prayer outside the public school setting than history 
and tradition, but it never identifies what this additional interest 
is.112 The non "market participant" metaphor affords government a 
fairly robust opportunity to demonstrate a paramount interest by 
demonstrating the protection of the rights of others, the protection 
of government, and the protection of social and legal 
institutions.113 Thus far, the Court has not identified a paramount 
interest for government prayer in any setting. 
Government statutes or policies permitting a "moment of 
silence" are a closer call. In these cases, government is not 
composing, conducting, or requiring a prayer. Arguably, a moment 
of silence is not inherently religious at all. 14 Government's interest 
in these cases may be to permit the free exercise of citizens who 
wish to pray, without burdening the competing rights of other 
11° Id. at 790 ("In this context [Congress approves pay for Chaplain three 
days before approval of final First Amendment language], historical evidence 
sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to 
mean, but also how they thought the Clause applied . . . their actions reveal their 
intent."). Even if this "unique history" justifies legislative prayer, does it also 
justify further appeals to history and tradition that are not as contemporaneous? 
III Id. ("It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected 
right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time 
covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it."). 
112 The Court further argues that legislative prayer has "no more potential 
for establishment" than the provision of school transportation, beneficial grants 
for higher education, or tax exemptions for religious organizations. Id. at 791. 
Under the non "market participant" metaphor, however, this "comparative" 
argument is not valid. Each of the listed comparisons is (arguably) a case of 
public aid or support that is universally available. Accordingly, in these cases 
government can present a prima facie justification that it is not competing in the 
"religion market." The same cannot be said for government prayer. 
113 See supra notes 94-96, and accompanying text. 
114 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("[A] moment of silence is not inherently religious. Silence, unlike prayer or 
Bible reading, need not be associated with a religious exercise."). 
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citizens who do not wish to pray.115 This would be a paramount 
interest under the metaphor of non "market participant." These 
cases arguably do regulate free exercise,116 but probably for the 
paramount reason of protecting the rights of others. On balance, 
these statutes and policies should be constitutionally permissible 
under the metaphor of non "market participant." 
b. Displays 
Presumably, government religious displays face the same 
difficulties that government prayers face. Again, government 
behavior displaying sacred symbols or text is similar to private 
citizen behavior in the "religion market." Moreover, government 
religious displays are forms of government support for a particular 
religious viewpoint or viewpoints that is not universally available 
to other religious viewpoints within the "religion market," or 
available to non-religious viewpoints outside of the "religion 
market." 
The Court has tried to justify government religious displays by 
either stressing the non-religious aspects of the displays or the 
"passive nature" of the displays. The non-religious aspects of a 
display usually refer to either the non-religious elements contained 
in the display, 117  or the role that the religious symbol or text has 
played in our legal, social, and political history." 8 The "passive" 
115 Id. ("During a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer is left 
to his or her own thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or 
thoughts of others . . ."). 
16 
 Prayer is often required in communal settings in which there may be a 
"call and response" component. Additionally, individual prayer may require a 
"public" confessional or declarative component. Requiring such prayers to be 
silent arguably burdens such religious exercise. 
117 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the 
creche, as the district court found, is not neutralized by the setting, the overall 
holiday setting [i.e., a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy 
canes, circus figures, a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, and sign reading 
"Seasons Greetings"] changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the 
purpose of the display . . . negat[ing] any message of endorsement of that 
conduct"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597-600, 614-20 
(1989) (stating that "the government's use of religious symbolism depends upon 
context" and finding stand-alone crèche in courthouse unconstitutional but street 
location of menorah accompanied by Christmas tree and sign saluting liberty 
constitutional). 
118 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688 (2005) (emphasizing 
"acknowledgments of the role played by the Ten Commandments in our 
Nation's heritage are common throughout America"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674-76 
(1983) (emphasizing "the role of religion in American life from at least 1789" 
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aspect of the display usually refers to the non-proselytizing effect 
of the religious symbol or text.119 These lines of defense are 
assumed to distinguish government religious displays from private 
religious displays, either placing them outside of the "religion 
market," or presumably presenting a paramount interest for 
government being in the market. 
It is not at all clear that government religious displays can (or 
should) be distinguished as these lines of defense assume; or, if 
they do possess these qualities, that government religious displays 
are unique in these respects. Private citizen displays of religious 
symbols or text are not necessarily more proselytizing or 
inherently more "active" than government displays.12° And it is 
doubtful that government religious displays always identify the 
non-religious aspects of the displays, whereas citizen displays do 
not. 
Even if government religious displays can be meaningfully 
distinguished from private religious displays in those limited cases 
where there are additional non-religious components in the 
displays, they cannot avoid their selective support for a particular 
religious viewpoint, or viewpoints.121 A crèche surrounded by 
and "countless other illustrations of the Government's acknowledgement of our 
religious heritage and governmental sponsorship of graphic manifestations of 
that heritage"). 
119 See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691 ("The placement of the Ten 
Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds is a far more 
passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the text confronted 
elementary school students every day."); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573, 662 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
("Noncoercive government action within the realm of flexible accommodation 
or passive acknowledgement of existing symbols does not violate the 
Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion in a way more direct and more 
substantial than practices that are accepted in our national heritage"). It is not 
clear from this line of defense whether "passive" displays of religious symbols 
and text are synonymous with displays that do not proselytize or coerce, or 
displays that do not "successfully" proselytize or coerce. If the former reading is 
correct, then probably both government and private displays are not passive (or 
they both are). If the latter reading is correct, then private displays are arguably 
more "passive" than government displays, given the special status and power 
attributed to government expression of support. 
12° See supra note 119. Of course, it would not be a problem for the 
metaphor of non "market participant" if private religious displays were primarily 
or always of a proselytizing nature, or of a "successful" proselytizing nature. 
The "free trade" in religion contemplates such private, citizen proselytizing 
taking place in the "religion market." 
Izi See supra note 106. See also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 717-18 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) ("[D]espite the Eagles' best efforts to choose a benign 
nondenominational text, the Ten Commandments display projects not just a 
religious, but an inherently sectarian message. There are many distinctive 
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candy canes is still a creche and not a menorah. The metaphor of 
non "market participant" therefore presumptively places such 
government actions inside the "religion market." This in turn 
requires government presentation of a paramount interest and the 
employment of the least restrictive means. The appeal to "history 
and tradition" or to "historical pedigree" has already been seen to 
be normatively inadequate in this regard.122 The appeal to 
government religious displays being no "more beneficial to" 
religion than other government support is also unavailing.123 And 
the recent justification for government religious displays—to 
acknowledge "beliefs widely held among the people of the 
country—"124 is also not compelling. It is apparently contended 
that government needs to acknowledge which religions are 
"winning" in the market. Of course, this acknowledgement is 
something government cannot do without entering into the 
"religion market" itself. 
Finally, government officials' religious expression is a closer 
cal1.125 On the one hand, government officials' expression of their 
religious viewpoints will most likely be received as carrying the 
imprimatur of the power and prestige of government. On the other 
hand, these individuals are also citizens and possess the same right 
to free exercise as other citizens.126 The metaphor of non "market 
versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different 
denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these 
differences may be of enormous religious significance."). 
122 See supra notes 44 and 111 and accompanying text. 
123 The Court also makes the now familiar argument that government 
religious displays are not "more beneficial to" religion than money for 
textbooks, school transportation, building funds, and tax exemptions. See, e.g., 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-82. Under the non "market participant" metaphor, 
however, this "comparative" argument is not valid. Each of the listed 
comparisons is (arguably) a case of public aid or support that is universally 
available. Accordingly, in these cases government can present a prima facie 
justification that it is not competing in the "religion market." The same cannot 
be said for government religious displays. 
124 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (settling for the "more limited" goal of government religious 
displays acknowledging "beliefs widely held among the people of this 
country"). 
See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675-77 (discussing Presidential 
Proclamations), and Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686-87 (same). 
126 Compare Justice Steven's insights when he writes, "when public 
officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their words are not 
exclusively a transmission from the government because those oratories have 
embedded within them the inherently personal views of the speaker as an 
individual member of the polity". Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in the original). 
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participant" does not prescribe a "religion free" public square; it 
only prescribes a public square free from government as a 
competitor in the "religion market." On balance, the metaphor of 
non "market participant" probably should find the religious 
expressions of public officials to be constitutionally permissible. 
2. Government Aid of Religion 
Turning to public aid of religion, the metaphor of non "market 
participant" takes seriously both the question asked by and the 
answer given in the Court's first case incorporating 
establishment—Everson v. Board of Education.127 The question 
asked was: how do courts draw the difficult line between 
constitutional and unconstitutional public aid of religion?128 The 
answer given, despite the opinion's strong language of 
separation,129 was: government aid of religion is constitutional if it 
is part of general, public welfare legislation.13° However, if 
government aid only extends to religion, whether "one religion, [] 
all religions, or prefer[ring] one religion over another," then the 
public aid in question presumptively is unconstitutional. 131 
The Court reasoned that to preclude citizens "because of their 
faith, or lack of it,"132 from receiving the benefits of public welfare 
legislation would "hamper [] citizens in the free exercise of their 
own religion" and thereby violate the commands of the 
amendment.133 In other words, to exclude citizens from public 
welfare legislation because of their religion effectively 
discriminates against them, and potentially violates their free 
exercise. The Court would not read the proscriptions of 
establishment as violating the prescriptions of free exercise. 
127 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
128 Id. at 14 ("[Courts'] decisions, however, show the difficulty in drawing 
the line between tax legislation which provides funds for the welfare of the 
general public and that which is designed to support institutions which teach 
religion"). 
129 The opinion's strong language of separation but apparent conclusion of 
"commingling" led Justice Jackson to comment, "the most fitting precedent is 
that of Julia who, according to Bryon's reports, 'whispering 'I will ne'er 
consent,'—consented.'") Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
13° Id. at 16 ("[W]e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey 
against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently 
prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its 
citizens without regard to their religious beliefs."). 
131  Id. at 15. 132 Id. 
133 Id ("other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey 
cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion"). 
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This answer comports with the metaphor of non "market 
participant." Excluding religion from general, public welfare 
legislation seriously affects the private ordering of outcomes in the 
"religion market." It violates the set of governmental duties to not 
interfere with, and to protect, the private orderings of citizen 
competitors' free exercise.134 
The important distinction drawn by the Everson Court is also 
extremely important to the metaphor of non "market participant" 
for another reason, primarily a reason concerned with 
establishment: it identifies when government is competing in the 
"religion market" and when government is competing in a different 
market. Only the former is proscribed by the metaphor of non 
"market participant." Accordingly, if government can demonstrate 
that the public aid in question is part of general, public welfare 
legislation, that the aid is universally available, then government 
presents a prima facie justification that it is not competing in the 
"religion market;" and thereby that the aid of religion presumably 
is constitutional under the non "market participant" metaphor. 
It follows that in cases dealing with general, public welfare 
legislation, the non "market participant" metaphor prescribes that 
the aid should be extended to religion. The Court's holdings 
dealing with public provisions for school transportation,I35 school 
books, 36 remedial education,137 class room materials,I38 building 
materials,I39 tuition deductions,I4° tax exemptions,I41 government 
subsidies to qualifying colleges and universities,I42 and special 
134 Compare Professor Laycock's insights when he writes: 
Police and fire protection [viz., public welfare legislation] 
are such a universal part of our lives that they have become 
part of the baseline. To deny police and fire protection would 
be to outlaw religion in the original sense of that word—to put 
religion outside the protection of the law. To demand that 
churches provide their own police and fire protection in a 
modern society would be to place an extraordinary obstacle in 
their way—a discouragement that would make religion a 
hazardous enterprise indeed. . . . The discouraging effect of 
cutting off basic services greatly exceeds the encouraging 
effect of providing them. 
Laycock, supra note 46, at 1005. 
135 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
136 Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
137 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
138 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
139 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
14° Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
141  Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
142 Roemer v. Md. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
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needs students,143 to name but a few cases, conform to the 
prescriptions of the metaphor. In each of these cases, the provision 
of generally available aid without regard to religion presents 
government with a prima facie justification under the metaphor 
that it is not competing in the "religion market." 
Additionally, in cases in which government provides a public 
forum or public access for speech, which again should be available 
to all without regard to religious preference, the metaphor of non 
"market participant" prescribes that the forum or access should be 
made available to religion.144 The Court's analysis of this line of 
cases again conforms to the prescriptions of the metaphor.'45  In 
each case, government can make a prima facie demonstration that 
the provision of assistance, which includes religion, is not directed 
at the "religion market." 
However, in those cases of public aid in which the aid is only 
made available to religion, whether to "one religion, [] all 
religions, or prefer[ring] one religion over another,"146 government 
cannot appeal to the justification that it is competing in another 
market. Instead, the presumption is squarely placed upon 
government that it is engaging in "competitor behavior" through its 
aid to religion. In such cases of governmental "tithing" to religion, 
similar to the support of citizens for their religious preferences, the 
burden shifts to government to demonstrate a paramount interest 
and the employment of the least restrictive means for such 
incursions into the "religion market." 
Perhaps the most famous cases of preferential government aid 
to religion are the state funding proposals consolidated in Lemon v. 
Kurztman.147 In order to "enhance the quality of secular education 
in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws,"148 the 
states of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island proposed funding for 
143 Witters v. Wash. Dep't. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
I" Compare Professor Laycock's analysis that "[t]he supporters of equal 
access argued that once classrooms were made available to other extracurricular 
groups, the use of the room was part of the baseline—a background norm that 
both religious and secular groups could take for granted." Laycock, supra note 
46, at 1006. 
145 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 
508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Good 
News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2000). 
146 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
147 Lemon v. Kurztman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
148 1d. at 613. 
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parochial school teachers149 in order to offset the rising costs of 
religious education.15° Because funding is not generally available 
to all teachers under the non "market participant" metaphor, 
government cannot present a prima facie justification that it is not 
competing in the "religion market." Instead, government must 
demonstrate a paramount interest and the use of the least restrictive 
means. Here, the interest in enhancing the quality of education in 
all schools is (arguably) a paramount interest. But the means 
employed are hardly necessary. Government would have to 
demonstrate that its paramount interest cannot be achieved, that it 
will be undermined, unless the funding of religion is permitted.151  
Needless to say, state government's ability to enhance secular 
education was not, and is not, undermined by the Court (correctly) 
proscribing these preferential funding proposals.152 
Finally, those cases in which government "arguably" is 
competing in another market but desires religious "trading 
partners" in that market are closer calls.153 These are the difficult 
cases that chiefly deal with the provision of social services.154 On 
the one hand, it may be assumed that the provision of social 
services is already being provided in the market by non-religious 
providers,155 so the addition of religious providers to the list of 
"trading partners" is making the aid generally available to all 
providers, regardless of religious preference. If this is so, then 
government may be able to present a prima facie justification that 
it is not competing in the "religion market" and, thereby, that the 
aid is constitutionally permissible. 
149 Id. at 607-11. Pennsylvania also proposed funding for textbooks and 
instructional materials, as well as teacher's salaries. Id. at 609. 
15° Id at 609. 
151  Compare the corresponding set of governmental duties in free exercise. 
See supra text accompanying notes 97-101. 
152 See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 
U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down state funding for maintenance and repair of 
nonpublic schools, tuition reimbursements for parents of nonpublic school 
children, and tax relief for parents of nonpublic school children). 
153 I say "arguably" competing in another market because the provision of 
social services can also be viewed as a religious duty in some religions. 
154 See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604A) 
("Charitable Choice" provisions) and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 
(2002) (providing vouchers to public school parents for non-public education, 
including religious schools). 
155 Without this assumption, the aid in question falls into the category of 
governmental preferential aid extended only to religion. See supra text 
accompanying note 146. 
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On the other hand, many religions are already competing in the 
market for social services and the additional aid may skew the 
"religion market" in the sense that other non-competing religions 
may now be forced to compete in the social services market where 
they would not have competed before.156 Additionally, those 
religions that are competing in the social services market before 
the provision of aid may have to change the way they compete 
after accepting the provision of government aid; such as requiring 
nondiscrimination against beneficiaries of the aid.I57 If this is so, 
then the proscriptions of the non "market participant" metaphor are 
fully engaged in order to avoid "crowding out private observance 
and destroying the natural interplay between competing beliefs."158 
The non "market participant" metaphor requires that we be 
"eternally vigilant"I59 over the ordering and outcomes of the 
156 Compare Professor Blasi's insights when he writes: 
Consider the possible impact of a voucher scheme on a 
denomination that historically has devoted its resources to 
missions aimed at the poor and not to sectarian education. 
Imagine the dynamics if, under a voucher system, the leaders 
of the religion feel pressured to invest in sectarian education 
simply to keep up with rival denominations that are 
successfully recruiting and then proselytizing voucher 
students. Apart from that kind of scenario, we might fear that a 
voucher system would induce religions to entrust their 
educational programs not to the most devoted and skilled 
teachers of the faith, but to persons who possess the 
entrepreneurial talents necessary for success in the 
competition for students. That might be considered a form of 
corruption that is none the less so for having been freely 
chosen, under the circumstances, by the proper religious 
authorities. 
Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions From 
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 797-98 
(2002). 
157 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604A(g) ("a religious organization shall not 
discriminate against any individual in regard to rending assistance under any 
program described in subsection (a)(2) of this section on the basis of religion, a 
religious belief, or refusal to actively participate in a religious practice.") and 
Zelman, 536 U.S at 645 ("Participating private schools must agree not to 
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to 'advocate 
or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred to any person or group on the basis 
of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.'"). 
Of course, the argument that religious providers chose to take the money 
offered and thereby waived their right to take it without the conditions attached 
does not answer the most important question under the non "market participant" 
metap
hor: Should government offer to make the deal? 
 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
159 See supra text accompanying note 54. 
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"religion market."16° Thus far there has been no significant 
showing of skewing that market's ordering or outcomes as a result 
of government aid to religious providers of social services; or, if 
there has been such distortion, there are probably paramount 
interests for the distorted outcomes.16I On balance, and it is a close, 
difficult balance indeed, the non "market participant" metaphor 
probably should find government aid for the provision of social 
services by religious providers to be constitutionally permissible. 
This brief analysis of how the metaphor of non "market 
participant" should be applied in establishment cases indicates that 
the prescriptions of the metaphor sometimes conform to the 
prescriptions of the historic metaphors of separation and neutrality, 
and other times does not. In the case of government religious 
expression, the non "market participant" metaphor generally 
comports with the historic metaphor of separation. Other than 
"moments of silence" and officials' religious expression, the 
metaphor generally proscribes government religious expression. In 
the cases of government aid of religion, the non "market 
participant" metaphor generally conforms to the prescriptions of 
neutrality. In cases where the aid is part of general, public welfare 
legislation or is part of government competing in a different 
market, the non "market participant" metaphor and the neutrality 
metaphor generally find the aid to be constitutional, but perhaps 
for different reasons. 
C. Anticipated Criticisms 
1. Free Exercise 
Several writers have claimed that reinserting courts into case-
by-case analyses of free exercise claims would stretch the 
competencies of the judicial branch beyond their breaking point. 
Either courts will tend to devalue the government interests 
employed to regulate free exercise,162 or they will devalue minority 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 50-57. 
161 For example, requiring nondiscrimination from all providers of social 
services, including religious providers, is a paramount interest under the non 
"market participant" metaphor because it is the protection of the fundamental 
interests of citizens. 
162 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm 
Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1090, 1215 ("The courts 
do not have the tools or the resources to investigate the larger public good and 
therefore are in no position to determine whether an exemption should be carved 
out of a particular law. The exemption decision properly belongs to the body 
entrusted with ensuring the public good—the legislature—which is situated 
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religious practices because they "will bear the brunt of the 
definitional and the sincerity inquiries."I63  
These lines of concern are blunted somewhat because courts 
have been applying the suggested doctrinal test, or something very 
close to it, for more a decade in federal statutory law. So far, there 
have been no apparent difficulties in courts handling these cases.I64 
Courts do not appear to devalue the government interests—if 
anything, courts feel a pull in the other direction165—nor do they 
appear to devalue the minority religious practices involved. In the 
cases to reach the Supreme Court under a heightened scrutiny 
standard, the Court has found in favor of the religious practices of 
Satanists, Wiccans, Asatrusians, the Church of Jesus Christ 
Christians, and the 130 members of the Brazilian Spiritualist sect 
of "Uniao Do Vegetal."166 Although this is a very small sample 
from which to draw conclusions, it seems fair to say that the 
religious practices involved in these cases were not "mainstream" 
religious practices. By proceeding through the courts in this 
sensitive area on a case-by-case basis, at least the petitioner gets 
the chance to have her day in court without first having to 
demonstrate "significant political clout," which is the threshold 
requirement for legislative protection and the main avenue of free 
exercise protection under the new metaphor of neutrality.167 
More importantly, instituting a heightened standard of judicial 
scrutiny for government burdens on religious practice serves an 
important "preventative" function: it tends to prevent the 
through its many contacts with the people and its access to wide-ranging, 
independent investigation to determine how particular religious practices will 
impact and therefore potentially harm citizens."). 
163 William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise 
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 311 (1991). See also Mark V. Tushnet, Of 
Church and State and the Supreme Court: Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. 
REV. 373 (1989) (claiming "only Christians win free exercises cases"). 
164 See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 436 ("We affirmed just last term the 
feasibility of case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally 
applicable rules. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005) . . 
. [w]e had 'no cause to believe' that the compelling interest test 'would not be 
applied in an appropriately balanced way' to specific claims for exemptions as 
they arose. Id. at 2122-23. Nothing in our opinion suggested that courts were not 
up to the task."). 
165 See supra note 100. 
I" See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) and Gonzales, 546 U.S. 
418. 
167 Cf. Laycock, supra note 46, at 1016 ("For a variety of reasons, therefore, 
we cannot always rely on legislatures to protect minority religious conduct. 
Courts are not always better, but they give religious liberty claims a second 
chance to be heard."). 
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enactment of laws that burden religious liberty in the first place. 
Court enforcement of heightened scrutiny in this area places 
government on notice that its regulations will have to avoid, if 
possible, interfering with religious practice. This notice should 
become internalized and normative. If this happens, petitioners 
may find that they have fewer cases to bring to the courts because 
government, mindful of heightened judicial scrutiny, has not 
enacted regulations burdening their free exercise in the first place. 
Some writers also claim that reintroducing the compelling 
interest test for free exercise is improper government "favoring" of 
religion over secular beliefs and practices and, thereby, runs afoul 
of the Establishment Clause.168 Of course, this notion of "favoring" 
only follows if one accepts the metaphor of neutrality. Lifting 
burdens on free exercise alone cannot be normatively justified 
under the evenhanded prescriptions of neutrality requiring the 
same treatment of religion and non-religion.169 But this metaphor 
has already been shown to be normatively inadequate)" 
Additionally, this position improperly equates the normative 
significance of government duties with government "favors." The 
correlative governmental duties grounded by the right of free 
exercise are not matters of grace; they are required by the strength 
of the right of free exercise. A personal interest too weak to ground 
correlative duties is not a personal right. The proper understanding 
of the meaning of rights depends upon this normative difference. 
For example, if you have been incarcerated in violation of your 
rights, government is not doing you a "favor" by freeing you. 
Finally, it is assumed that reintroducing courts to the case-by-
case analysis of free exercise petitions will open up the 
"floodgates" of litigation swamping the judicial system. Under the 
current neutrality metaphor, courts have left the field to 
legislatures. Any proposal to return to the judicial protection of 
free exercise probably will require an increase in court resources 
and time. However, the assumed "swamping" of the courts is 
speculative at best. The "flood of litigation" argument, while often 
raised, is also often exaggerated. Moreover, it is a poor argument 
for denying recovery for any genuine injury to our constitutional 
rights. As Professor Prosser writes in another context dealing with 
similar allegations: 
168 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 163, at 320. 
169 However, those who hold this position have to explain why legislative 
accommodations of free exercise are apparently permissible, while 
constitutional accommodations are not. Legislative accommodations also appear 
to be a violation of evenhanded treatment. 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 26-44. 
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It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs 
that deserve it, even at the expense of a "flood of 
litigation" . . . in the words which Chief Justice Holt 
made famous in another connection, "it is no 
objection to say, that it will occasion multiplicity of 
actions; for if men will multiply injuries, actions 
must be multiplied too; for every man that is injured 
ought to have his recompense."171 
The judicial system, critics notwithstanding, apparently 
managed quite well under the "floodgates" of free exercise 
litigation in the pre-Smith period. It will do so again if the 
compelling interest test is reinstated. Furthermore, the potential 
flood of litigation may be stemmed by the "preventative" function 
mentioned earlier.112 Government regulations improperly 
burdening free exercise may decrease, and petitioner religious 
liberty claims as well, as a result of government's ex ante notice 
that heightened judicial scrutiny will be applied to any and all of its 
enactments. 
2. Establishment 
Perhaps the most salient criticism to be raised against the non 
"market participant" metaphor in the area of establishment is that it 
requires the courts to police the boundaries of the "religion 
market." Candidly, it does. Courts, it will be pointed out, are parts 
of government and as such they also should be non "market 
participants" in the "religion market" under the metaphor. But if 
courts are to police the boundaries of the "religion market," they 
must determine the boundaries of the market. And such 
determinations are prototypical of actions taken by participants in 
that market. The metaphor apparently proscribes the very thing it 
prescribes. 
The answer forthcoming under the metaphor is that there is a 
normative difference between government participating as a 
competitor in the market, which is proscribed by the metaphor, and 
government protecting competitors in the market so that they can 
compete, which is prescribed under the metaphor. This difference 
171 William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New 
Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939) (quoting Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 
938, 955 (1703)). 
172 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 167-168. 
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will require government to take its lead on these issues from the 
private orderings, choices, and acts of citizens. The judicial 
determinations of the boundaries of the market therefore must be 
based upon evidence of the private orderings, choices, and acts of 
citizens. Such determinations have no independent normative 
justification if based on the actions of other parts of government or 
on other court rulings. 
Of course, citizens acting in the market need not make such 
reference to other citizens' behavior in the market; this is what it 
means to be a competitor in the market. But courts must do so in 
order to have any normative justification for the determination of 
the boundaries of the market. In this sense, courts do not 
participate in the market as competitors; or perhaps more 
accurately stated, courts do not participate as competitors 
participate in the "religion market." The only available normative 
justification for the courts' behavior in policing the market is the 
protection of citizen behavior in the market; because citizens, not 
government, determine the boundaries of the "religion market." 
A comparison to courts policing other fundamental interests 
may be helpful here. In the free speech context, perhaps there is no 
more important distinction than the distinction between 
government regulations based on the content of the speech and 
government regulations that are content neutra1.173 As difficult as 
policing this distinction is for the courts, courts do not prescribe 
content-based regulations of speech when they enforce the 
proscriptions against such regulations. Neither should courts 
necessarily have to prescribe the boundaries of the "religion 
market" when proscribing government competitor behavior in that 
market. 
But even if the protection of the market entails normatively 
different obligations than participating in the market, the question 
may again be asked: why should courts do the policing? Will these 
13 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994) ("the 
First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does 
not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed 
by private individuals. Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to 
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon 
speech because of its content. . . . In contrast, regulations that are unrelated to 
the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, because in 
most cases they pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or 
viewpoints from the public dialogue. Deciding whether a particular regulation is 
content-based or content-neutral is not always a simple task.") (internal citations 
omitted). 
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obligations stretch the competencies of the courts past their 
breaking points?174 
However, there is no reason to believe that courts will have 
more difficulty policing the "religion market" than other 
fundamental interests. Moreover, the requirement that courts 
present their reasoning in writing may provide a unique check on 
these government actors. Courts must write down their rationales 
for policing the market and these rationales can be cross-
referenced against the behavior of private citizens in the market. 
This transparency exposes the normative underpinnings of the 
court's action and reinforces the normative prerequisites for the 
action in the first place. Legislative enactments and executive 
orders do not face the same transparency requirements. The 
required transparency of judicial determinations provides an 
important and vital check on these government actors—one that is 
not present in the justification of other government actions under 
our constitutional system. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the radically under-determined constitutional text 
and drafting history, the Supreme Court's religion clause 
jurisprudence has always been dominated by a central metaphor or 
constitutional norm. The metaphor has primarily been employed to 
prescribe (and to proscribe) the proper legal and political 
relationship between government and religion. The historic 
metaphors of separation and neutrality chosen by the Court to 
accomplish this important task are normatively inadequate. The 
metaphor of separation is inadequate because it places the 
protection of free exercise in jeopardy and entails discrimination 
against religion in cases where government aid is universally 
available while unnecessarily pitting the prescriptions of free 
exercise and establishment against one another. The metaphor of 
neutrality is inadequate because it proscribes the use of the 
compelling interest test, effectively sacrificing the fundamental 
status of free exercise, and does not require non-discrimination 
against religion in cases of universally available aid while 
improperly embodying a preference for majority religions that is 
inconsistent with our nation's commitment to denominational 
neutrality. 
As a result of these inadequacies, a new metaphor for religion 
clause jurisprudence may be necessary—the metaphor of 
174 See supra text accompanying notes 162-167. 
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government as a non "market participant" in the "religion market." 
This metaphor essentially combines two other metaphors found in 
constitutional jurisprudence, Justice Holmes's metaphor of the 
"marketplace of ideas" and the metaphor of "market participant" in 
the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The 
normative obligations of the metaphor both prevent government 
from regulating the behavior of citizen competitors in the "religion 
market" (free exercise) and prevent government from becoming a 
competitor or engaging in competitor behavior in that market 
(establishment). 
In the context of free exercise, the non "market participant" 
metaphor returns the compelling interest test to its rightful place 
and generally sides with the prescriptions of the separation 
metaphor and not neutrality. This is the necessary result of the non 
"market participant" metaphor's commitment to private orderings, 
choices, and acts being solely determinative of the outcomes of the 
"religion market." 
In the area of establishment, the non "market participant" 
metaphor generally sides with the prescriptions of the neutrality 
metaphor in cases of general, public welfare legislation. Under the 
non "market participant" metaphor, this is the necessary result of 
government presenting a prima facie justification that it is 
competing in a different market than the "religion market." 
However, in the area of government religious expression and in 
cases of government aid or support extended only to religion, the 
metaphor of non "market participant" generally sides with the 
separation metaphor and not neutrality. This is the necessary result 
of the non "market participant" metaphor's general proscription of 
government behavior that competes in the "religion market." 
It is time to see beyond the enticing imagery of the Court's 
selected metaphors of separation and neutrality. The imagery has 
so captivated and transfixed the Court's gaze that the Court has 
lost its way navigating the serious normative inadequacies of both 
metaphors. The Court must return to a truer course in its religion 
clause jurisprudence, setting its sights on the single goal of 
maximizing religious liberty for citizens. Our nation's commitment 
to the religious liberty of our citizens requires no less from the 
Court, or from us. The metaphor of non "market participant" can 
serve as a guide and compass. 
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